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JURISDICTION AND CERTIFICATION OF PURPOSE
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
amended. The Court's decision was entered November 13, 1992. This petition for rehearing
is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and is presented in good faith
and not for purposes of delay.

POINTS OF LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT,
Plaintiff and appellant Nielsen hereby petitions for rehearing of the appeal in this action
only with respect to the Court's denial of appellant's claim for pre-judgment interest. Petitioner
submits that the Court overlooked or misapprehended certain points as follows:
The Court's decision was based upon the misapprehension that Nielsen did not pursue
a claim for breach of contract against respondent Metropolitan in the court below, and failed to
address Nielsen's argument that pre-judgment interest is available even in a non-contract action
if the insurer knew or should have known that its insured was entitled to full policy limits.

1

ARGUMENT
THE COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON THE MISAPPREHENSION
THAT NIELSEN DID NOT ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST METROPOLITAN, AND FAILED
TO ADDRESS NIELSEN'S ARGUMENT THAT INTEREST WAS
AVAILABLE EVEN IF NO CONTRACT CLAIM WAS INVOLVED.
In the appeal of this matter, appellant Nielsen argued that respondent Metropolitan is
liable for pre-judgment interest on the amount of its policy limits, which this Court found to be
$250,000, until the date upon which the limits were paid to Nielsen after the trial. (Brief of
Appellant, pp. 19-25; Brief of Respondent, pp. 28-35; Reply Brief of Appellantf pp. 18-24).
In its Opinion, the Court recognized Nielsen's argument that "he has a contractual
relationship with Metropolitan and, therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1)
(redesignated as § 15-1-1(2)) and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. [701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985)], he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the $250,000 regardless of the policy limits."
(Opinion at 10). The Court further recognized that "Beck established that a first-party insured's
claim against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives
rise to a cause of action in contract whereby consequential damages may be awarded in excess
of policy limits. Section 15-1-1(1) establishes the legal rate of prejudgment interest in a breach
of contract as 10 percent per annum." (Id.)
In rejecting Nielsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, however, the Court made the
following assertion:
The difficulty with this argument is that Nielsen did not pursue a breach of
contract claim against Metropolitan. The proceedings were limited to establishing
2

coverage under the policy, and no determination was made as to whether the
policy was breached. Nielsen never asserted that Metropolitan breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nor did he assert that
Metropolitan breached an express covenant by failing to "pay all sums which the
insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages" pursuant to the
policy's terms. (Bold in original.) Indeed, Metropolitan promptly paid the
$250,000 after the judgment. Because Nielsen failed to pursue a claim for breach
of contract, we do not address the issue of whether an insurer who breaches a
contract with its first-party insured is liable for prejudgment interest in excess of
the policy limits.

In declining to reach the issue of Nielsen's entitlement to pre-judgment interest, the Court
erroneously assumed that Nielsen's action against Metropolitan did not encompass a breach of
contract theory in addition to the coverage issue to which the Court referred. Nielsen's amended
complaint, included in the record on appeal under U.R.A.P. ll(d)(B)(i) and attached in the
Addendum, sets forth as its Fourth Cause of Action the following allegations:

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
17.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 11 through 16 above.

18.
Defendant insurance company [Metropolitan] has provided
uninsured motorist insurance to plaintiff Richard Nielsen, wherein defendant
insurance company agreed to indemnify plaintiff for damages sustained in any
accident caused by the negligence of the operator of any uninsured vehicle up to
the policy limit of $250,000.00.
19.
The collision described above was caused entirely by the negligence
of defendants O'Reilly and French, who were uninsured at the time of the
accident.
20.
After the accident plaintiff made timely demand on defendant
insurance company for payment of plaintiff s damages as provided by the terms
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of the insurance policy. Defendant insurance company has refused and still
refuses payment of all damages sustained as a result from the accident.
21.
Defendant insurance company is therefore liable to plaintiff for all
damages plaintiff is entitled to recover against defendants O'Reilly and French.
(R.28). The request for relief against Metropolitan sought, among other things, pre-judgment
interest. (R.29).
The amended complaint sets forth the elements of a breach of contract claim: The
existence of a contract (the insurance policy); breach (refusal of payment of Nielsen's damages
as provided by the terms of the insurance policy); and harm (refusal of payment). While the
cause of action had no specific label such as "breach of contract," well-established principles of
notice pleading require only that a plaintiff set forth allegations of conduct sufficient to put the
defendant on notice of the plaintiffs claim. "[T]he fundamental purpose of our liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their adversary have
'fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved.'" Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). As courts
have unanimously concluded under the similar federal rule, it is not necessary under the notice
pleading provisions of Rule 8 to identify specific legal theories, if factual allegations are
sufficient to support any claim for relief. See, 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1219 ("Rule 8(a) eliminates the concept of 'cause of action'"), and cases cited
therein.

4

The allegations of Nielsen's amended complaint include assertions that payment of policy
limits was due under the terms of the policy, demanded, and refused. If Nielsen's claim had
been solely relating to coverage, as the Court assumed, the complaint would need only to have
alleged a UM insurance relationship and an accident involving an uninsured motorist. The
additional allegations of Metropolitan's refusal to make payment as obligated under the policy
are sufficient to state a claim against Metropolitan under a breach of contract theory.
Throughout the proceedings below, Metropolitan never challenged the fact that Nielsen
was asserting a breach of contract claim.

Instead, Metropolitan contended that it was

inappropriate to characterize the claim as sounding in contract for purposes of pre-judgment
interest, arguing that the amount due under the contract could not be ascertained with
mathematical certainty.1 Thus, even if the amended complaint had not set forth the elements
of a breach of contract claim with sufficient specificity, Metropolitan's and the district court's
recognition that Nielsen was in fact asserting such a claim effectively amended the complaint to

1

Metropolitan made a similar argument on appeal:
In essence, Nielsen is trying to make a contract action out of a case that is clearly
a tort action. While it is true that an action by an insured against his carrier is
an action based on contract, this is not such an action. No suit has been filed
against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any claims been made.
Rather, Nielsen is attempting to claim what Utah law clearly does not allow, by
couching this action as a contract action rather than recognizing that the claim he
is making is for prejudgment interest on the damages he sustained in the
underlying tort action (the automobile accident). (Brief of Respondent, p. 28).

Metropolitan then devoted the remainder of its discussion to claiming that Nielsen's
damages were not calculable with mathematical accuracy, which ordinarily precludes prejudgment interest on general damages in a personal injury case. (Id., pp. 28-31).
5

encompass the contract claim. U.R.Civ.P. 15(b) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings.").
In rejecting appellant's claims, the Court thus made a factual assumption — that Nielsen's
action only related to coverage - which was directly contradicted by the pleadings and the
parties' conduct below. The Court's reliance upon the erroneous assumption that Nielsen did
not pursue a breach of contract claim against Metropolitan warrants rehearing, so that the Court
may reach the issue of pre-judgment interest which it declined to decide based upon that
assumption.
Additionally, the Court's opinion fails to address Nielsen's argument that, even if the
action against Metropolitan were not grounded in contract, pre-judgment interest would be
awardable if Metropolitan knew, or should have known, that it would have to pay policy limits
to Nielsen. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 20, and cases cited therein.) Thus, if Nielsen had not
in fact alleged a breach of contract claim, the line of cases cited in Nielsen's brief would
nonetheless provide entitlement to pre-judgment interest if a jury determined that Metropolitan
knew, or should have known, that Nielsen was entitled to immediate or earlier payment of the
$250,000 policy limits.
Finally, in connection with his argument for pre-judgment interest, Nielsen noted that
public policy would not favor allowing a first-party insurer to refuse payment in a clear policy
limits case for seven years, allowing the insurer the use of that money for those years, and

6

ultimately face no greater penalty than having to pay those limits. In declining to invoke the
public policy considerations favoring an award of interest, the Court noted that "absent
legislative direction to the contrary, contracts are to be enforced as written." (Opinion at 11).
On this issue, it should be noted that the legislature has indicated that delay in payment of
insurance benefits should result in the imposition of interest in addition to the benefit amount.
In 1985, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, which provides: "Unless
otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an
insured. By rule the commissioner may prescribe . . . the reasonable interest rates to be charged
upon late claim payments."

The plain implication of this provision is that interest is

appropriately awarded on untimely benefit payments, even though such interest might exceed the
benefits cap under a particular policy. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-8 [now 31A-22-309(5)]
(untimely personal injury protection benefit payments subject to interest at 1 1/2% per month;
person entitled to such benefits may bring action in contract to recover the payments plus the
applicable interest).
It is apparent that the Utah legislature recognizes the appropriateness of requring an
insurer to pay interest on benefits not paid timely, even though such interest may necessarily
exceed the cap on the benefit amount. This Court should therefore make a determination of the
availability of such interest in the instant case.

7

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests the Court to grant
rehearing on the issue of pre-judgment interest.
DATED this

of November, 1992.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

JM/W-1
'.. Rich Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00-

Richard H. Nielsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mark O'Reilly, Linda R. French,
and Metropolitan Property &
Liability Insurance Co.,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 900489
FILED
November 13, 1992

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City,
for Richard Nielsen
Glenn C. Hanni, Barbara L. Maw, Salt Lake City, for
Metropolitan Property

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Richard H. Nielsen appeals the judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court that $250,000 is the maximum
recovery possible under the uninsured motorist provision of an
insurance policy issued by defendant Metropolitan Property &
Liability Insurance Co. ("Metropolitan") . We affirm.
The facts of this case are undisputed. Prior to April
of 1983, Nielsen purchased an insurance policy from Metropolitan.
The policy insured two automobiles owned by Nielsen and was in
force at all relevant times. Among other coverages, the policy
included uninsured motorist protection with a limit of $250,000
for "each person" and $500,000 for "each accident." Metropolitan
charged a separate premium for each vehicle.
On April 28, 1983, Nielsen and his son were involved in
an automobile accident with two uninsured motorists, Mark
O'Reilly and Linda French. As a result of the accident, both
Nielsen and his son sustained personal injuries and filed claims
with Metropolitan. Metropolitan settled the claim of Nielsen's
son and made a partial payment of $1,707 to Nielsen. However, no
settlement was reached on the remaining portion of Nielsen's
claim. Ultimately, Nielsen filed suit against Metropolitan,

O'Reilly, and French, seeking an apportionment of fault and a
determination of Nielsens damages and Metropolitan's liability.
The suit proceeded to a jury trial. O'Reilly and
French defaulted. However, Metropolitan undertook their defense,
disputing Nielsen's damage claims and asserting that Nielsen's
own negligence was the primary cause of the accident. At trial,
the parties stipulated that the question of Metropolitan's
liability would not be presented to the jury. Rather, the court
would determine Metropolitan's liability based on the jury's
special verdict.
The jury determined that Nielsen was 3 percent at fault
and O'Reilly and French were 97 percent at fault and awarded
Nielsen $213,593 in special damages and $500,000 in general
damages. After a reduction for comparative fault and an addition
of interest and court costs, the court entered judgment against
O'Reilly and French in the amount of $707,590.
Following trial, Nielsen moved for summary judgment,
seeking to recover the entire $707,590 judgment from Metropolitan
in addition to prejudgment interest. Metropolitan argued that
the limit on its coverage is $250,000 and that an insurer is not
liable for prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limits.
The trial court ruled in favor of Metropolitan.
This case presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether
the $250,000-per-person limit, as opposed to the $500,000-peraccident limit, governs Nielsen's claim; (2) whether Nielsen is
entitled to stack the policy limits because he paid separate
premiums on two automobiles; and (3) whether Nielsen can recover
prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits. Because the
trial court disposed of each of these issues on summary judgment,
which by definition decides only questions of law, we grant the
trial court decision no deference and review for correctness.1
In claiming that he is entitled to the $500,000 limit
and that he may stack the policy limits, Nielsen asserts that the
trial court erred in interpreting the policy's language.
Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language
presents a question of law to be decided by the trial judge using

1

Summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25
(Utah 1990).
No. 900489

2

accepted methods of construction,2 Specifically, the terms of
insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be
interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted meanings
and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize and
give effect to all of the contract provisions.3 To protect
against overreaching insurers and because courts construe
contracts against their drafters, ambiguities in the policy are
resolved in favor of coverage.4 Policy language is ambiguous if
it is not "'plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and
understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and
in the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of
the policy.#,,s
Nielsen first contends that the language of the policy
can be read as providing coverage of $500,000 in cases where two
or more people suffer injuries in one accident and that any
language purporting to limit liability to $250,000 per person is
ambiguous. Therefore, this language does not deny coverage. The
provision in question states:
Protection Against Uninsured Motorists
Coverage.
The limit for Protection Against
Uninsured Motorists Coverage stated in the
Declarations as applicable to "each person11
[$250,000] is the limit of METROPOLITAN'S
liability for all damages arising out of
bodily injury sustained by one person in any
one accident, and subject to this provision,
the limit of liability stated in the
Declarations as applicable to "each accident"
[$500,000] is the total limit of
METROPOLITAN'S liability for all such damages
2

LPS Hosp. v, Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858
(Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895
(Utah 1988).
3

LPS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 858; Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at

895.
4

See Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.r
190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11-12 (June 22, 1992); LPS HOSP., 765 P.2d
at 858; Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 669 P.2d 410, 417
(Utah 1983); Phillips v. Utah Local Gov'ts Trust, 660 P.2d 249,
250 (Utah 1983).
5

LPS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 858-59 (quoting Auto Lease Co. v.
Central Mut. Ins., 325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958) (footnote
omitted)).
3

No. 9004RQ

for bodily injury sustained by two or more
persons in any one accident.
(Bold in original.) Nielsen maintains that this language is
ambiguous because the policy does not define the terms "subject
to this provision" and "person." This fact, however, does not
render the policy unclear to a person of ordinary intelligence
and understanding. The policy clearly limits the amount one
person can recover in one accident to $250,000, and therefore,
the provision should be given effect.6
Similarly, Nielsen asserts that he is entitled to stack
the applicable policy limit. He points out that uninsured
motorist coverage, unlike liability coverage, is not linked to a
particular vehicle but is a floating coverage that covers the
insured for injuries and damages caused by uninsured motorists in
all circumstances. Therefore, he argues, it is reasonable to
expect additional coverage upon the payment of an additional
premium. Nielsen claims that this fact creates an ambiguity as
to whether he should be able to stack two policy limits of
$250,000 to arrive at a total limit of $500,000, because he paid
separate premiums on two automobiles.
The policy, however, contains the following provision:
5. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND
METROPOLITAN.
With respect to any occurrence, accident
or loss to which this and any other
automobile insurance policy issued to the
named insured by METROPOLITAN also applies,
the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S liability
under all such policies shall not exceed the
highest applicable limit of liability or
benefit amount under any one such policy.
(Bold in original.)
Nielsen claims that this provision is ambiguous because
it appears in the general conditions section as opposed to the
uninsured motorist section and because it refers to other
insurance instead of other coverages. These facts, however, are
of no significance. The provision clearly prohibits the stacking
of policy limits. Indeed, we have held almost identical language

6

Other jurisdictions have found similar provisions to be
unambiguous. See Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, Michigan
v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97, 103 (9th Cir. 1952); Allstate Ins. v.
Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733, 735 (Wash. 1986).
No. 900489
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to be unambiguous,7 Furthermore, the placement of a provision
does not affect its validity. As noted above, insurance policies
must be interpreted as a whole, giving effect to all provisions.
Reading the policy as a whole, the above-quoted language resolves
any ambiguity as to whether an insured can stack policy limits.
Nielsen also argues that even if we determine the
above-quoted provision to be unambiguous, the provision should
not be given effect. Rather, as a matter of public policy, we
should enforce Nielsens reasonable expectation that he can stack
the policy limits.
In making this argument, Nielsen asks this court to
adopt a version of the reasonable expectations doctrine, a
doctrine developed to protect against overreaching insurers that,
under certain circumstances, allows courts faced with an adhesion
contract to look to the insured's reasonable expectations in
determining policy coverage.8 Other jurisdictions have adopted
various formulations of this doctrine, such as allowing the
enforcement of expectations in direct conflict with clear policy
language.9
This court, however, has never adopted any version of
the doctrine. Indeed, in a case just recently decided, Allen v.
Prudential,10 we declined to adopt two formulations of the
doctrine presented in thai: case. Specifically, we rejected an
assertion that in dealing with an adhesion contract, the
reasonable expectations of the insured should be enforced as a
7

In Martin v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294, 295 (Utah 1969),
we found the following provision to be unambiguous:
With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other insurance
policy or policies issued to the insured by
the Company also apply, no payment shall be
made hereunder which, when added to any
amount paid or payable under such other
insurance policy or policies, would result in
a total payment to the insured or any other
person in excess of the highest applicable
limit of liability under any one such policy.
8

See AljLen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; see also Roger C.
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance
Law After Two Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 823 (1990) [hereinafter
Henderson].
9

See Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; see also Henderson;
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered. 18 Conn.
L. Rev. 323, 335-36, 345 (1986).
10

190 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (June 22, 1992).
5
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matter of course.11 We noted that such a claim was without
support and "overreaches the rationale for the [reasonable
expectations] doctrine, even at its broadest [point]."12
We also rejected a more mainstream approach suggested
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Wagner v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange.13 Under the Wagner formulation, the insured's
reasonable expectations may be enforced if "the insurer knew or
should have known of the insured's expectations; . . . the
insured created or helped to create these expectations, and . . ,
the insured's expectations are reasonable."14 If the fact
finder is convinced that these three requirements are met, the
reasonable expectations of the insured will be enforced in the
face of contrary and unambiguous policy language.15
In rejecting Wagner's approach, we noted that
regardless of the formulation of the reasonable expectations
doctrine, substantial uncertainty surrounds "the theoretical
underpinnings 16of the doctrine, its scope, and the details of its
application."
We also noted our belief that case-by-case
development of Utah's traditional equitable
remedies suffices to
protect against overreaching insurers.17
However, the holding in Allen is predicated primarily
on the predominant role the legislative and executive branches
have undertaken in regulating the insurance industry and
establishing the public policy underlying Utah's insurance
law.18 We rejected the Wagner formulation oecause, in the
absence of legislative direction, invalidating a clear provision
on the basis that the insurer knew about and helped to create a
reasonable expectation in conflict with the provision would
undercut expressed legislative policy underlying the regulation

11

Id. at 10.

12

Id.

13

786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

14

id. at 766; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law
and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations
of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1179-80 (1981).
15

See Wagner, 786 P.2d at 766-67.

16

Alien, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

17

Id^ at 12.

18

See id. at 10 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-2-101 to
-29-123 (1991)).
No. 900489
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of the insurance industry.19 Specifically, such an approach
conflicts with the legislatively expressed policy that f"freedom
of contract' be maintained and that written contracts be the
primary means by which this freedom of contract [is]
exercised."20 In so holding, we did not abandon our
responsibility to develop common law principles relating to the
insurance industry within parameters not preempted by the
legislature. Rather, we merely reaffirmed our traditional
position of deferring to legislatively announced policy.21
The instant case differs from Allen in two important
respects: (1) the formulation of the doctrine before the court;
and (2) the fact that Allen dealt with title 31A, the insurance
code in effect after July 1, 1986, while the present case deals
with title 31, the insurance code in effect prior to July 1,
1986.22 We turn first to the question of the formulation of the
reasonable expectations doctrine. Nielsen does not advance a
recognized version of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Instead, he bases his argument on two factors peculiar to the
instant case.
First, he argues that his expectation of the ability to
stack policy limits is reasonable, given the floating nature of
uninsured motorist protection, i.e., protection that is not
linked to a particular automobile, and the fact that he paid
separate premiums on two automobiles. Second, he points to the
fact that in calculating the premium for the secqmd vehicle.
Metropolitan does not take into account that: part of the premium
charged on the first insured vehicle is a cnarge for uninsured
motorist protection. The result is that the more vehicles
insured, the more Metropolitan charges for uninsured motorist
protection.23

19

See id. at 11.

20

Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-1-102(7), 31A-21-301 to
-404 (1991 & Supp. 1991)).
21

See id. at 10-11; see alsor e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto,
Ins. v. Mastbaum. 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983).
22

See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 242.

23

It appears from the record that when he purchased the
insurance, Nielsen did not have a subjective expectation that he
was entitled to stack his policy limits. Instructions to the
jury stated that the maximum amount recoverable from Metropolitan
was $250,000. It appears from the attorney's argument that
Nielsen did not make his claim of entitlement to stack his policy
limits until after the jury verdict was returned.
7
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In essence, under Nielsen's formulation, if the insured
can link a reasonable expectation of greater coverage to the
payment of an additional amount in premiums, the insured's
reasonable expectations will be enforced in the face of clear
policy language to the contrary• Given our holding in Allen, the
first question in determining if we should adopt this version of
the doctrine is whether it undercuts legislatively announced
public policy.
We again note that the insurance code applicable in the
instant case differs from the insurance *code applicable in Allen.
Any analysis of the distinctions between title 31 and title 31A
must begin with the recognition that, as we observed in AllenP
"[m]any of the provisions in title 31A mirror the provisions in
title 31, and both titles are equally comprehensive in their
scope and regulatory effect."24
Indeed, both titles establish an "Insurance Department"
and delegate to the commissioner the power to promulgate rules
implementing the provisions of the insurance code and the power
to investigate violations of the insurance code. 25 Under both
titles, preprinted policies must be filed with the commissioner,
who has the authority to invalidate any form determined to be
deceptive or unfair.26 Thus, as in Allen, "the validity of
preprinted insurance contracts is premised on executive
approval."27 Finally, inherent in both titles is the
legislatively announced policy that freedom to contract be
maintained and written contracts be the primary means by which
this freedom is exercised.28 Clearly, the same policy relied
on in Allen applies in the instant case, and therefore, the Allen
reasoning applies here with equal force.
24

Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 n.8.

25

Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-2-1 to -16 (1953 & Supp.
1983) (repealed 1986) with Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-2-101 to -311
(1991).
26

Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-19-9(1) to -10 (1953)
(repealed 1986) with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-201(2)(a)(i) (1991).
27

Allen, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

28

Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-19-1 to -29 (1953 & Supp.
1983) (repealed 1986) (setting forth detailed provisions for the
right to contract, authorizing insurance clauses, and
establishing that any modifications must be in writing) with Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7) and §§ 31A-21-303 to -404 (1991 & Supp.
1991) (establishing policy of maintaining freedom to contract,
setting forth detailed provisions authorizing and governing
insurance contract clauses, and setting forth acceptable methods
of modification).
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We have decided several cases under title 31 wherein an
insured sought to stack uninsured motorist limits, and in each
case, we refused to allowed stacking.29 One case, Martin v.
Christensen,30 is similar to the case at bar. In Martin, the
plaintiff argued that because two separate premiums were paid to
one insurance company, the plaintiff should be allowed to stack
policy limits despite clear policy language to the contrary.31
This contention was based in part on the argument that the
legislature, in enacting uninsured motorist legislation, intended
to allow stacking in such circumstances.32 However, we
concluded that the legislature had no such intention and enforced
the contract as written.33 Utah therefore has no public policy
in favor of stacking policy limits when an insured pays multiple
premiums to the same insurer.
Given Allen and Martin, we decline to adopt Nielsen's
position. Ignoring the clear language of the policy because
Nielsen claims that he expected additional coverage due to the
payment of an additional premium would significantly modify
legislatively expressed public policy underlying the regulation
of the insurance industry. Charging more for uninsured motorist
protection to those who insure more than one vehicle may not be
the most rational method cf calculating premiums. However, it
does not justify a judicial rewriting of the insurance contract
in violation of legislative policy and prior case law. Hence,
the trial court did not err in ruling that the policy limit on
Nielsen's claim is $250,000.
Finally, Nielsen contends that the trial court erred in
declining to award prejudgment interest in excess of the policy
limits. First, Nielsen claims that he has a contractual
relationship with Metropolitan and, therefore, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1) (redesignated as § 15-1-1(2)) and Beck v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange,34 he is entitled to prejudgment
interest on the $250,000 regardless of the policy limits. Beck
established that a first-party insured's claim against an insurer
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
gives rise to a cause of action in contract whereby consequential
See Lvon v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co,, 480 P.2d
739, 745 (Utah 1971); Martin v. Christensen. 454 P.2d 294, 296
(Utah 1969); Russell v. Paulson, 417 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1966).
30

454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969).

31

Id. at 295.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
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damages may be awarded in excess of policy limits.35 Section 151-1(1) establishes the legal rate of prejudgment interest in a
breach of contract as 10 percent per annum.
The difficulty with this argument is that Nielsen did
not pursue a breach of contract claim against Metropolitan. The
proceedings were limited to establishing coverage under the
policy, and no determination was made as to whether the policy
was breached. Nielsen never asserted that Metropolitan breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Nor did he
assert that Metropolitan breached an express covenant by failing
to "pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages" pursuant to the policy's terms.
(Bold in original.) Indeed, Metropolitan promptly paid the
$250,000 after the judgment. Because Nielsen failed to pursue a
claim for breach of contract, we do not address the issue of
whether an insurer who breaches a contract with its first-party
insured is liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the
policy limits.
In an alternative argument, Nielsen claims that the
insurance policy and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 provide for the
award of prejudgment interest on his special damages in excess of
the policy limits.36 Metropolitan admits that the policy
provides for the award of prejudgment interest on Nielsen's
special damages. A majority of courts have interpreted the
language "all sums which the insured . . • shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages" to include prejudgment interest
properly awarded in the underlying personal injury action.37
These courts reason that prejudgment interest is part of the
damages the insured is legally entitled to recover.38 However,
the policy limits clearly apply to the term "damages."
Therefore, Nielsen may not be awarded prejudgment interest in
excess of these limits.39

35

Id. at 800-02.

36

Section 78-27-44 establishes that prejudgment interest
may be awarded on special damages in personal injury cases.
37

See, e.g., Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979);
Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cooper. 262 A.2d 370
(R.I. 1970); see also 15S Couch on Insurance 2d, § 56:10 (1983)
[hereinafter Couch].
38

See, e.g., Guin v. Ha; Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Cooper; see also Couch at § 56:10.
39

See Guin v. Ha; Factory Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Cooper; see also Couch at § 56:10.
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As for Nielsen's claim that as a matter of public
policy he should be awarded prejudgment interest in excess of the
policy limits regardless of the policy language, we reiterate the
public policy requirement that absent legislative direction to
the contrary, contract provisions are to be enforced as written.
Hence, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Nielsen is not
entitled to recover prejudgment interest in excess of the policy
limits.
Affirmed,

WE CONCUR:

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

Russell W. Bench, Court of
Appeals Judge

STEWART, Justice:

(Dissenting)

The majority opinion holds that an insurance company
may sell two Uninsured motorist coverages to an insured, charge
two premiums for those coverages, and then never have to pay out
under one of them. The majority condones what I submit is
unconscionable conduct tantamount to fraud on the plaintiff and
the public.
The plaintiff purchased an automobile insurance policy
that provided separate coverages on each of the insured's two
automobiles. The policy provided two uninsured motorist
coverages for which the insured paid two separate premiums. Each
coverage had a policy limit of $250,000. The plaintiff was
injured by an uninsured motorist and suffered damages in the
amount of $707,595.
The plaintiff contends that he is entitled
to recover $250,000 under each coverage, or a total of $500,000,
because he bought and paid for two coverages. This Court holds
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover under only one
uninsured motorist coverage because the "other insurance clause"
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in the policy relieves the insurance company from liability under
the second coverage.1
Uninsured motorist coverage, unlike liability and
collision coverages, is not tied to the insured's automobile but
covers injuries to the insured whether the injury occurs in his
automobile or elsewhere. Thus, M[c]overage is available to the
insured while occupying any motor vehicle, whether owned or
nonowned, insured or uninsured, or while the insured is on foot
or on horseback." 3 Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability
Insurance § 31.02[8], at 31-18.2 (2d ed. 1992); see also Tucker
v. Government Employees Ins. Co.. 288 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla.
1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan. 575 P.2d 477, 479 (Haw.
1978); Chaffee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 591 P.2d
1102, 1104 (Mont. 1979); Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Ravnes. 563
P.2d 815, 820 (Wash. 1977).
Under the most elementary concepts of honesty and fair
dealing, when an insured pays for two coverages and the insurance
company collects two premiums, the insured ought to have the
benefit of both coverages.2 The Supreme Court of Kansas has
stated: "When we pay double premiumfs] we expect double
coverage. This is . . . in accord with general principles of
indemnity that amounts of premiums are based on amounts of
liability." Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34, 42
(Kan. 1969). In my view, it is unconscionable to allow an
insurance company to collect a second premium and give nothing in
return on the ground that the insured consented to the fraud by
virtue of a provision in the insurance contract. This is
particularly so when the coverage is mandated by statute and the
insured has not expressly waived it.

1

The other insurance claim provides:
5. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND
METROPOLITAN.
With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other automobile
insurance policy issued to the named insured
by METROPOLITAN also applies, the total limit
of METROPOLITAN'S liability under all such
policies shall not exceed the highest
applicable limit of liability or benefit
amount under any one such policy.
(Bold in original.)
2

Clearly, a plaintiff should
than one coverage when his damages
However, the issue here is not one
plaintiff's injuries exceeded both
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not be able to collect on more
do not exceed the first.
of double recovery because the
coverages.

The inequity of allowing insurance companies to charge
a premium on a coverage for which they will never have to pay out
has led a large majority of courts to allow insureds to recover
under two or more coverages, that is, to allow "stacking." See
Great Central Ins. Co. v. Edge, 298 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 1974); Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark, v. Barnhill, 681 S.W.2d 341 (Ark.
1984); Yacobacci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 A.2d 987 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1976) ; Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So.
2d 689 (Fla. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 177
S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1970); American Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 575 P.2d
881 (Haw. 1978); Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 389
N.E.2d 1150 (111. 1979); Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.. 267
N.E.2d 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Siddons, 451
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970); Bourgeois v. Government Employees Ins.
Co. , 316 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Langston v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 561 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Cardin v. Roval
Ins. Co. of Am., 476 N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1985); Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1984);
Cameron Mut. Ins. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976); Chaffee,
591 P.2d 1102 (Mont. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586
P.2d 313 (Nev. 1978); Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 382
S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1989); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d
594 (Okla. 1980); Sones v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 411 A.2d
552 (Penn. 1979) ; Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 140
S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1965); American States Ins. Co. v. Milton, 573
P.2d 367 (Wash. 1978); see also Vernon v. Harleysville Mut.
Casualty Co., 135 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1964); Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
Indeed, courts have specifically allowed insureds to
stack coverages despite clear policy language that purports to
prohibit stacking, whether by way of "other insurance,"
"exclusionary," "excess coverage," "anti-stacking," or other
limiting clauses. See, e.g., Edge, 298 So. 2d at 608; Maglish.
586 P.2d at 314-15; Brown, 446 So. 2d at 1006; Chaffee. 591 P.2d
at 1104; Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.r 556 N.E.2d 983
(Mass. 1990); Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.r 201 N.W.2d
786 (Mich. 1972); Ravnes, 563 P.2d 815.
Although the Utah statute requiring uninsured motorist
coverage sets minimum limits for coverage, it does not fix a
maximum limit. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-21.1 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a similar statute
requiring uninsured motorist coverage cannot be limited by
clauses in the policy aimed at limiting liability. Blakesleer
201 N.W.2d at 791. That court stated:
It would be unconscionable to permit an
insurance company offering statutorily
required coverage to collect premiums for it
with one hand and allow it to take the
coverage away with the other by using a self13
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devised "other insurance" limitation.
Nothing could more clearly defeat the
intention of the legislature.
Id. ; see also Boettner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d
795, 798 (Mich. 1972). In Tucker v. Government Employees
Insurance Co.. 288 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme
Court addressed the issue of stacking two coverages issued under
one policy in the context of statutorily mandated uninsured
motorist coverage. That court stated in language that is
applicable here:
The total uninsured motorist coverage which
the insured has purchased for himself and his
family regardless of the number of vehicles
covered by his auto liability policy inures
to him or any member of his family when
injured by an uninsured motorist. Moreover,
according to Sellers v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.r [185 So. 2d 689
(Fla. 1966),] such total coverage is
applicable to any uninsured motorist
negligently injuring the insured or any
member of his family covered thereby. The
statute admits of no authority in the insurer
by a provision in the policy to limit
coverage on the presumed basis that the
uninsured motorist would only have covered
himself with the minimum auto liability
coverage required under F.S. Section
324.021(7), F.S.A. The determinant of the
amount of coverage is the total which the
insured purchases pursuant to the authority
of the statute and not that which the insurer
otherwise attempts to limit by a provision in
the policy.
An insured under uninsured motorist
coverage is entitled by the statute to the
full bodily injury protection that he
purchases and for which he pays premiums. It
is useless and meaningless and uneconomic to
pay for additional bodily injury insurance
and simultaneously have this coverage
cancelled by an insureds exclusion. The
premium rates are standard and uniform on a
per car basis. The insured's full protection
cannot be whittled away by exclusions or
limitations . . . .
Id. at 242. In Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden. 533
S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976), the Missouri Supreme Court, quoting Great
Central Insurance Co. v. Edge, 298 So. 2d 607, 610 (Ala. 1974),
No. 900489
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stated, "Cases should not and will not turn on how well the
insurer drafts a limiting clause because the law does not permit
insurers to collect a premium for certain coverage, then take
that coverage away by such a clause no matter how clear or
unambiguous it may be." In American Insurance Co. v. Takahashi.
575 P.2d 881 (Haw. 1978), the Hawaii Supreme Court construed a
limiting clause that contained language similar to the one at
issue in this case. That court stated:
[S]eparate uninsured motorist insurance
coverage must be provided in at least the
minimum statutorily required amounts for each
automobile insured under a single liability
insurance policy. In Morgan, three
automobiles were insured under a single
liability policy. We concluded that under
the provisions of HRS §§ 431-448 and 287-7,
$10,000 of per person uninsured motorist
coverage was separately provided for each of
the insured automobiles.

We hold that the limits of liability
clause in the policy before us is invalid
insofar as it attempts to defeat the
statutory requirements of HRS § 431-448.
American cannot reduce its liability for
uninsured motorist coverage below the
statutorily required minimum amounts for each
insured vehicle. See Walton v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 55 Haw. 326,
518 P.2d 1399 (1974). Therefore the
limitation of uninsured motorist coverage to
a maximum of $20,000 "regardless" of the
number of automobiles to which the policy
applies is null and void.
Id. at 883-884; see also Cardin v. Roval Ins. Co. of Am.r 476
N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1985); Bourgeois v. Government Employees Tna.
CCLL, 316 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
It is indefensible to suggest, as this Court did in
Martin v. Christensen. 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969), that the
legislature intended to allow an insurance company to collect a
premium for statutorily mandated coverage and then nullify that
coverage with a clause in an adhesion contract. I would overrule
Martin v. Christensen to the extent that it prohibits stacking
when more than one premium has been paid.
Clauses in insurance policies that prevent stacking are
inconsistent with the general statutory policy mandating
uninsured motorist coverage. They are also unconscionable and
15
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should be stricken to the extent that they allow an insurance
company to refuse coverage after collecting premiums for what
appears to be statutorily mandated coverages. See generally
Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-42
(Utah 1985) ; Donald M. Zupance, Annotation, Doctrine of
Unconscionabilitv As Applied to Insurance Contracts, 86 A.L.R.3d
862 (1978).
I dissent.

Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stewart,
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, does not participate
herein; Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. NIELSEN,

)

MENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
MARK C'REILL". LINDA ~;
and KE: "*OFOLI7AN PROPEI
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO

.iO .

ld/-^oo

Hcr.er F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
Plaintiff; through his counsel complains of defendants and
alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Richard H. Nielsen, is a resident cf Salt

Lake County, State of T;tah.
2.

Defendant,

Mark

O'Reilly,

was

at

the

time

of

the

accident a v ;oident of Salt lake Count*/, State of Utah.
-^.naaT.

T>

a resident of Salt Lake

4.

Defendant Xetrcpciitan Property S Liability Insurance

Company is a foreign corporation transacting insurance business
in the State of Utah.
5.
company ! s

At all tir.es mentioned herein, defendant insurance
actions

and

omissions

were

performed

by

said

defendant's agents and employees ;;ho were at all times acting
within the purpose and scope of their agency and employment, and
defendant insurance company approved the acts of its agents and
employees relating hereto.
r:.Kbi Lr.ubo Or

/-»CJ. 1UW

6.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 5 above.

7.

Defendant Mark O'Reilly, on or about April 28, 19S3,

was driving a vehicle owned by defendant ~inda R. French in a
necrlicrent and ^ or reckless manner ard coll"' "ed w* th olaintifffs
vehicle

while

plaintiff

v?s

driving

eastbov~d

on

4500

South

Street, at the intersection cf TOO East and 4500 South, Murray,
Salt Lake County, Utah.
S.

At the time cf the accident, defendant O'Reilly was

legally intoxicated and negligently and carelessly operated his
vehicle in such a manner that manifested a reckless disregard or
indifference to the rights and safety of others.
9.
plaintiff

As a proximate result of defendant O'Reilly's conduct,
incurred cov-?--;- .<r:d r: eminent personal

injuries, the

for a period of time and has incurred substantial lost earnings
and will continue to lose earnings in the future.

Plaintiff has

and will continue to suffer great pain, discomfort, emotional
trauma, permanent partial disability and disfigurement.
10.

As a further proximate result of defendant O'Reilly's

conduct, plaintiff sustained property damage to his 1970 Buick
Skylark.
11.

Plaintiff

is, therefore, entitled

to recover all

special and general damages in an amount of at least $300,000, to
be determined at the time of trial.
SECO::P CAUSE OF ACTION

1213.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 11 above.
Defendant

defendant

O'Reilly's

carelessly

consented

Linda

R.

intoxicated

French,

*>;ith

state..

tc defendant O'Reilly's

knovrledge

negligently

of
and

operation of her

vehicle, thereby exhibiting an reckless disregard or indifference
to the rights and safety of others.
14.

As a proximate result of defendant French's conduct,

she is liable for all of the plaintiff's damages resulting from
the accident described above.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
15.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 thrcugh 14 above.
t-: C'Ro'll"?c end French's conduct exhibited

plaintiff

to

recover

punitive

damages

in

an

amount

to

be

determined at trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
17.

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 11 through 16 above.

18.

Defendant insurance company has provided uninsured

motorist

insurance

to

plaintiff

Richard

Nielsen,

wherein

defendant

insurance company agreed to indemnify plaintiff for

damages sustained in any accident caused by the negligence of the
operator

of any uninsured vehicle up to the policy limit of

$250,000.00.
19.
the

The collision described above was caused entirely by

negligence

of

defendants

O'Reilly

and

French,

who

were

uninsured at the time of the accident.
20.

After the accident plaintiff node timely demand on

defendant insurance company fcr payment of plaintiff's damages as
provided

by

the

terms

of

the

insurance

policy.

Defendant

insurance company has refusad and still refuses payment of all
damages sustained as a result from the accident.
21.
plaintiff

Defendant insurance company is therefore liable to
for

all

damages

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

recover

against defendants O'Reilly and French.
V7HEREF0RE, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
defendants

O'Reilly

and

French,

jointly

and

severally,

for

cornonsatarv da~""ar; ':.r: -an amount to bo '.ictr-rr.-'ned at trial and

at trial, together with pre-judgment

interest, costs and all

other relief deemed equitable by the court.
prays

for

judgment

against

defendant

Plaintiff further

insurance

company

incurred by plaintiff

for

indemnification

for ail damages

in the

above-described

accident, together with pre-judgment interest,

costs and ail other relief deemed equitable by the court.
DLTED this 16th day of August, 1938.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By

fi*M^*t ^a^fi<^JK
L. Rich Kumpherys
Richard van't Rood
Attorneys for Plaintiff

